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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 11-3859 
   
 
GRANT MANUFACTURING & ALLOYING, INC., 
             Appellant. 
 
v. 
 
GREGORY McILVAIN; DARYL WILLIAMS 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 5-10-cv-01029) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 14, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 2, 2012) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Grant Manufacturing & Alloying, Inc. brought suit against Gregory McIlvain and 
Daryl Williams, alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 
U.S.C. § 1030, and Pennsylvania law.  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
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favor of Grant as to all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the remaining state law claims.  Grant appeals that decision.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
I. Background 
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with this case.  Therefore, we 
will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
Grant is a manufacturer of tin, tin alloys, and specialty products serving the 
electronics, plating, and tin chemical industries.  McIlvain and Williams began working 
for Grant as sales representatives in 1986 and 1988, respectively.  On February 19, 2010, 
McIlvain and Williams resigned from Grant to work for Nathan Trotter and Company, 
Inc., one of Grant’s competitors. 
The day before McIlvain and Williams resigned from Grant, McIlvain accessed 
Grant’s computerized purchase order system and marked sixty-three customer and 
distributor records for deletion.  On the date of McIlvain and Williams’s resignation, 
Jeffrey Fried, Grant’s independent information technology consultant, came to Grant’s 
offices to work on transitional issues and discovered the records that McIlvain had 
marked for deletion.  When Fried alerted Grant to this fact, Grant asked Fried to examine 
all data in the computer system to determine whether McIlvain or Williams had tampered 
with any other records.  Fried did so and compiled a number of reports showing that 
Grant’s computer records had been altered in the week before McIlvain and Williams’s 
departure.  Fried could not determine exactly when during that period the changes were 
made or who made the changes.  Grant contends that McIlvain and Williams modified 
 3 
 
the computer records prior to their resignation to make Grant’s pricing less competitive 
and to sabotage its business. 
Fried billed Grant $9,312.50 for the work he performed relating to McIlvain and 
Williams’s departure.  The charges were related to routine transitional matters as well as 
the tasks of restoring the data that McIlvain marked for deletion and verifying the 
integrity of Grant’s computer system.  Fried’s time entries on the invoice submitted to 
Grant specify the dates and the number of hours he worked, as well as the tasks he 
performed.  However, the entries do not distinguish between the time spent working on 
issues relating to McIlvain and Williams’s alleged malfeasance and the time spent on 
routine transitional issues.  At his deposition, Fried was not asked, nor did he state, how 
much of his bill was attributable to McIlvain and Williams’s alleged misconduct.1  Fried 
also testified that he was able to restore the data marked for deletion in about fifteen 
seconds and that this task alone would cost about $100.   
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment, and, in doing so, resolve all factual disputes 
and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  
Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment 
                                              
1
 Due to a scheduling conflict, Grant’s counsel was unable to attend Fried’s 
deposition.  Grant’s motion to quash the subpoena for Fried’s deposition was denied.  
Grant does not appeal that decision. 
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is appropriate when there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III. Discussion 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Grant presented sufficient evidence to 
permit a jury to conclude that it had suffered more than $5,000 in losses, as defined by 
the CFAA.  We agree with the District Court’s determination that Grant failed to do so. 
The CFAA permits private causes of action only if the conduct at issue causes a 
“loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in 
value[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I); see also id. § 1030(g) (permitting private right 
of action).  The statute defines “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the 
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, 
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue 
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of 
service.”  Id. § 1030(e)(11).   
Grant brings three independent causes of action under the CFAA.  The parties do 
not dispute that the $5,000 threshold applies to each cause of action.  The parties also do 
not dispute that the only loss at issue is the $9,312.50 in costs incurred by Grant for 
Fried’s services.  Thus, the only way Grant could survive summary judgment was by 
presenting evidence that would permit a jury to infer that at least $5,000 of Fried’s bill 
was attributable to a response to McIlvain and Williams’s alleged CFAA violation.   
As noted above, Fried’s time entries do not indicate how long it took him to 
resolve issues related to a potential CFAA violation.  The only evidence in the record is 
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Fried’s deposition testimony, in which he stated that he spent about fifteen seconds 
restoring the data, which was worth about $100 of his time.  Grant offered no other 
evidence at the summary judgment phase or on appeal showing that the costs associated 
with the alleged CFAA violations approximated $5,000.  Therefore, the District Court 
correctly held that a reasonable jury could not find that Grant satisfied the $5,000 
requirement because Grant submitted insufficient evidence showing how much time, or 
the proportion of time, Fried spent responding to McIlvain and Williams’s alleged 
misconduct. 
Grant’s argument on appeal appears to be that vital evidence is missing from the 
record.  In short, Grant asserts that, if its counsel had attended Fried’s deposition, counsel 
would have been able to elicit testimony from Fried as to how much time he spent 
responding to the alleged CFAA violations and that this testimony would give rise to a 
genuine dispute of material fact.  However, the fact of the matter is that Grant’s counsel 
did not attend Fried’s deposition, nor did Grant’s counsel proffer any other admissible 
evidence on this critical issue.  Absent any evidence in the record suggesting that Fried 
needed more than a few moments to address the purported CFAA violation, a jury could 
not conclude that at least $5,000 of Fried’s bill related to such a violation. 
Because Grant has failed to present sufficient evidence that it suffered a loss as 
defined by the CFAA, we need not reach Grant’s arguments concerning evidence of 
violations of specific provisions of the CFAA. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
